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Valuation

DraftKings Updated Model – Dependent on Betting Market Growth

  • DKNG reported earnings and gave guidance for 2021 above consensus estimates
  • We believe DKNG is fully valued at these levels and would look for proof of increased total market opportunity or DraftKings outsized market share

What’s new: DKNG reported Quarterly adjusted revenues of $133mn (+42% year-over-year (y/y)), which was at the high-end of the pre-announced $131mn-$133mn range. (link) DKNG also reported adjusted EBITDA of -$197mn, better than Wall St. Consensus expectation of -$203mn.

Also with the earnings release, management increased revenue guidance to $540mn to $560mn, and introduced 2021 revenue guidance of $750mn-$850mn (+45% y/y at the midpoint), the consensus estimate was $776mn. This range doesn’t include contributions from Michigan or Virginia, which could both launch online sports betting late this year or early next. Management’s guidance assumes that they continue to operate in all states where they are currently live and announced sport calendars aren’t disrupted.

Valuation Methodology: I continue from my initial valuation of DKNG last week – What’s clear is that more states will legalize betting and more Americans will be exposed to sports betting and online gambling avenues and the market will grow overall. What is less clear, however, is how fast this market will grow. I approach this valuation by starting high level, focusing on the growth of online betting markets, and then following with DKNG’s market share of the future betting markets. I believe DKNG is simply a beneficiary of overall online betting market growth, not some standalone idiosyncratic tech pioneer, therefore I believe starting with Total Available Market (TAM) is the best approach for a valuation here. From Deutsche Bank in their updated Note on DKNG ‘Limited Changes to Forecasts’ “We expect the market to continue to trade shares around TAM and growth trajectory views, much of which will be dictated by the pace of legalization and investors garnering a better understanding of how [that] ultimately flows to net revenue and, down the road, EBITDA.” (Sell-side Research Link – sub req.) We use 2025 EBITDA as anything beyond five years is simply impossible to predict. Feel free to disagree with me in the comments and tell me why you disagree.

I try to keep this analysis high level so we can plug and play growth figures for both the market and DKNG’s share of that future market because analyzing line items or on modelling on revenue multiples, is a pointless exercise for growth companies because appreciating from $500M to $5B is way more likely than $100B to $1trn. This is a rapidly changing company in a disruptive industry and it’s stock price reflects expectations of the future of American online gambling and DraftKings’ ability to capture an increasing share of that market growth.

How is the Street valuing DKNG?: Goldman is Neutral rated with a 12-month price target of $53 based on equal parts 2030 EV/EBITDA (discounted), 21.3X 2024 Sales, and a Discounted Cash Flow mode. (GS Research portal – sub req)

Morgan Stanley is in-line and equal-weighted with a price target of $37 valuing DKNG on a 18.5x 2025 EBITDA model. 18.5X is a comparable tech multiple. (MS Research portal – sub req)

Deutsche Bank models DKNG at a price target of $48 on a multiples of 25x 2027 EBITDA, discounted at 5% for 5 years. They note that every 10% move in EBITDA from their current forecast is worth ~$4 to their Price Target and every multiple point is ~$2. (Sell-side Research Link – sub req.)

Our Model: I start off with management’s 45% y/y growth figure for 2021. I credit DKNG with this growth next year, then crucially, I decrease the growth rate by 5% every year forward, so 40% growth in 22, 35% in 23, etc. because DKNG is starting from a smaller revenue base so 45% will be easier to achieve in 21 than it will be from a higher base in 23.

If the online sports betting and gambling markets grow at these rates from 2020-2025 (about a 35% annual growth rate), and DKNG is able to capture a 23% blended total market share of these markets, at a 30% EBITDA margin and 18.5x EBITDA multiplier (we borrow this from MS), I get a valuation of around $39, implying ~9% downside. Let’s look closer:

I start off by estimating the online sports betting and gambling market size below. I go off the estimated 2020 figure of around $3.14bn – $1.33bn from sports gambling, $1.5bn from iGaming, and $286mm from Daily Fantasy. Next I grow them by the CAGR’s in the previous paragraph and you see the results. For purposes of this valuation I designate this growth profile as my Base case. I don’t want you to stay fixated on the ~35% CAGR but rather to see the effects of the rate on overall market size come 2025. We can argue all day about the numbers, but trying to estimate the growth of the market to the decimal for 5 years out is not an efficient exercise. This is still a nascent market experiencing a lot of disruption with no clear predecessor case studies.

We get a TAM of over $14bn in 2025 with our estimates

Is this a reasonable TAM: Deutsche Bank is a noted Bear on this sort of sports betting TAM Share argument in the 20bn to 25bn range for sports betting. They say in their “A Lot of Unfounded “Expectations” at a Lofty Price; Remain Sell” Note on Penn National, “Said simply, in the period from March 2019 through February 2020, prior to the pandemic, the per adult spend on sports betting (GGR/NJ adult population) was $51. Given there are 240 mm adults in the US, to arrive at even a $20bn TAM, implied that not only does every state legalize and all 240 mm adults can bet sports on their mobile phones, but that … the adult spend grows by ~65% from this $51 level”. (DB portal -sub req) I look at the idea of full legalization and spend per adult in the table below.

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Our estimates

To get to our $20bn TAM, indeed every US adult would need to be spending $84 a year on sports betting and online gambling. This ties out with DB’s 65% figure.

Next I estimate the DraftKings’ EBITDA based on the market size and their share of this future market. An important point is DKNG’s promotions and how much it subtracts from top-line revenue. We use 20% here, but management has stated in the past that promotions are generally in the high 20%’s. We give DKNG credit for being able to continue to decrease promotional activity in the future, so for our 2025 EBITDA analysis we settle on 20%. Just for reference, promotions were ~26% in Q1 and Q2 of this year.

I use a healthy 30% EBITDA margin across all levels of market share and market size. As you can see, our Base Case is $785 mm in EBITDA for 2025. Not bad for a company expected to have over negative $400mm in EBITDA for 2020.

Our estimates

Finally, given the current stock price of $42.84 at close on 11/13, what is the implied 2025E EBITDA multiple for all these scenarios? Here’s a table summarizing that below:

At the close of 11/13 DKNG is valued at 20.38x our 2025 estimated EBITDA based on our model assumptions and estimates

Every additional turn in the EBITDA multiple adds ~$2 to our price and every additional $100 mm in 2025 EBITDA adds ~$5. If the market grows by only 15%/ year with lower market share and EBITDA margins in our Bear Case, we get a valuation of $14. Likewise, if the market grows at 45%/year with higher market share and EBITDA margins in our Bull Case, we get a $75 valuation.

I layout some clearer Bear/Base/Bull Case scenarios at the bottom as well in more detail:

Upside Risks to Valuation:

  1. Stronger than expected performance in 2021, which could accelerate growth in TAM realizations
  2. Better-than expected margin performance, especially less promotion activity that eats into top-line revenue
  3. DKNG is able to take outsized market share
  4. Favorable regulatory events and large states making progress toward sports betting

Downside Risks to Valuation:

  1. Considerable stock unloaded coming off management lockup agreements from the IPO
  2. TAM expectations becoming more muted, leaving far-out forecasts like the 2025 EBITDA we use being especially vulnerable
  3. Promotional activity could last longer than we think and be a drag on revenue
  4. Greater impact from competitors, leading to decreased market share and/or further necessitated promotional spend
  5. Negative legislative outcomes

Model for download here:

Posts are not investment advice or endorsements.

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